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IN T R O D U C T IO N
The traditional engineering understanding of efficiency is the
optimization of output given a fixed input. T he systems approach of
engineering identifies three major components in any process of con
verting scarce resources into desirable goods and services: the input of
the factors of production (manpower, capital, technology, informa
tion), the transfer function (procedures and organization of production),
and the output. Traditionally, engineering has concentrated on that
aspect of efficiency pertaining to the optimal allocation of the factors
of production. In public management, efforts in this direction have
included work measurement, resource allocation modeling, improved
scheduling, routing and location techniques, inventory and materials
control, and capital budgeting.
Efficiency also depends on the nature of the transfer function.
T w o important considerations here are the incentive structures for
employees and organizational design both within and outside the pro
duction unit. Attempts to improve efficiency through personnel man
agement reform include monetary incentives, personnel performance
appraisal, use of management-by-objectives, profit sharing, job en
richment, and in-service training. W ith respect to organizational
change, various institutional arrangements are being experimented with
in local government which introduce competitive elements into public
service delivery and/or incorporate higher levels of cooperation between
1 Dr. Toft is a professional engineer, public administrator, and policy
analyst.

190

191
governmental units; e.g., consolidation, decentralization, contracting
out, issuing of vouchers.
It is this last approach to improving efficiency that will be the
theme of this paper. The purpose of the paper is to briefly survey some
trends in an area of efficiency improvement with which engineers have
some influence, but in which they have had little formal training; viz.,
organizational design and intergovernmental relations.
T H E SIZE A N D E C O N O M IC O R G A N IZ A T IO N O F
M U N IC IP A L SERVICES D E L IV E R Y
In many cases the delivery area of a municipal service is restricted
to the boundaries of a particular jurisdiction. T he political boundaries
that often constrain the delivery service area may not be consistent with
the optimal delivery service area size. Economies of scale may be such
that larger delivery units would be desirable. Furthermore, in the
past, the favored economic organization for the production of municipal
services has been the local governmental department. T hat is, it has
been customary for the local government authority to be the sole or
monopolistic producer of property-related municipal services.
In recent years a trend towards special districting, especially in
relation to utilities, has become evident. Even more recently trends
towards the use of other institutional arrangements can now be
observed in some parts of the country. There appears to be a wider
effort on the part of local elected officials, administrators, and municipal
engineers to draw in the profit-making and not-for-profit community
organizations as partners in the provision of municipal services. Notice
ably, there is a breaking down of the definite demarcation between
private and public sectors at the local level.
T H E F U N C T IO N S O F A P U B L IC
W O RK S D E P A R T M E N T
The purpose of a public works department is to provide the com
munity with certain property-related goods and services which for any
of a variety of reasons are not efficiently provided through the free
market. A common reason for the public works department having
responsibility is that by nature the good or service closely approximates
a pure public good; i.e., individuals cannot be excluded from the use
or benefits of the good, e.g., streetlighting. Another common reason is
that production or consumption of a good produces significant negative
spillovers on the community, i.e., unaccounted for costs or harm such
as garbage storage.
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It is important to highlight that even if a public works depart
ment has a responsibility to provide a good or service, it does not
necessarily have to produce it. In providing a service, the public works
department may perform any one or more of the following functions:
—planning
—financing
—production
Planning involves estimating of supply and demand functions for
the good including the forecasting of costs. Financing includes pricing
and revenue policies, budgeting, and expenditure analysis. Production
refers to the actual conversion of input resources to desirable out
comes. Logically, it is not necessary for the governmental unit to
execute all three functions for each good or service. For example,
contracting requires planning and financing, but production is achieved
in the private sector. Regulation calls for planning only by the
governmental unit.
T H E A D V A N TA G ES A N D D ISA D V A N TA G ES O F F U L L
SERV ICE D E L IV E R Y T H R O U G H C IT Y D E P A R T M E N T S
There are a variety of advantages and disadvantages associated with
a city department being both provider and producer of the goods and
services for which it is responsible. The advantages stem from the
advantages of bureaucratic structure where the organization is highly
mission-oriented. Despite the frequent criticisms of governmental
bureaucracy, without it much of modern governmental administra
tion would be impossible. Briefly, some advantages are:
— an effective system of coordination over the delivery of the good
— a high level of control
— experts are able to direct and decide
— permanency of operations
— stability even with mobility of personnel
— impartial and apolitical
— minimizes nepotism, favoritism, bribery, and corruption
On the other hand some major disadvantages are:
—sloth and inertia, resistance to change
— expert’s insensitivity to citizen needs
— timidity
— depersonalized service
— dearth of incentives to improve efficiency
— limitations of the beaucracy as a mechanism for signaling con
sumer demands and citizen needs
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T he central issue is not whether a centralized bureaucracy is
good or bad, but to what extent does it provide an institutional environ
ment for efficient service delivery? A systems analytic approach to
such a question calls for an identification of what other alternatives
exist.
A L T E R N A T IV E IN S T IT U T IO N A L A R R A N G E M E N T S
Apart from operating its own production unit within a govern
mental department, local government has open to it the following
options:
— contracts with a private firm
— establish a franchise
—establish standards of service, certify private vendors, then leave
it up to consumer choice
— issue vouchers to families, permitting them to purchase from any
authorized supplier
— contract with another governmental unit
— consolidate service with adjoining governmental units
— establish special districts for areawide delivery
—purchase specialized technical and support services from other
jurisdictions or private firms
It appears that the choice of an appropriate institutional arrange
ment depends on the specific characteristics of each good or service,
the quantity and level of service, and the equity issues involved. It
appears there is a trend towards matching specific goods and services
with specific institutional arrangements for their provision and
production.
T R E N D S IN T H E USE O F A L T E R N A T IV E S
T O C IT Y D E P A R T M E N T S
Information on trends in institutional arrangements for delivering
municipal services is limited. “A 1973 survey for the International
City Management Association (IC M A ) found that 61 percent of
responding municipalities have formal or informal agreements for the
provision of services to their citizens by other governmental units or
private firms.”1 This study and a later one conducted in California by
the Institute of Government and Public Affairs, UCLA, in 1975 suggests
that more extensive use is made of alternatives to city departments in
1 E. S. Savas (ed.), Alternatives for Delivering Public Services, Westview
Press, Boulder, Co., 1977, p. 116.
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the W est than in the East and South. The implications for public
works engineers in Indiana are that experiences in the W est may be
worth evaluation. The California study interviewed 26 city managers
regarding their currently preferred arrangements and expected shifts.
The findings presented in Table 1 show that where city departments
are the currently preferred arrangement, shifts in the future are
generally expected. Also expected is a general shift toward more
private sector involvement in property-related engineering services,
e.g., tree trimming, street cleaning, refuse collection.
TABLE 1.

TRENDS IN THE USE OF ALTERNATIVES TO
CITY DEPARTMENTS

Service

Current Preferred
Choice

Expected Shift to

General Law Enforce
ment
Fire Protection

City Department

Tree Trimming
Street Cleaning and
Patching
Traffic Signal
Maintenance
Residential Refuse
Collection
Public Transportation
Water Pollution
Abatement
Planning, Zoning,
Subdivision
Business Refuse
Collection
Solid Waste Disposal
Libraries
Animal Control and
Shelter
Ambulance Services

City Department
City Department

Joint Powers with
other Jurisdictions
Joint Powers with
other Jurisdictions
Private Contract
Private Contract

Private Contract

Private Contract

Private Franchise
Special District
Regional Government

Private Contract
Private Franchise
Special District
Regional Government

City Department

Regional Government

County Contract

Private Franchise

na

County Contract
County Contract
County Contract

na
na
na

Private Contract

na

Source: E. S. Savas (ed.), A lternatives for D eliverin g Public Services:
T o w a r d Im p ro v e d Performance, Westview Press, Boulder, Co., 1977, p. 123.

REASONS F O R T H E USE O F A L T E R N A T IV E S
T O C IT Y D E P A R T M E N T S
T he reasons for this trend can be categorized as theoretical and
practical:
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Theoretical Reasons
In recent years there has been a more systematic examination of
public economy by economists and political scientists. Economists have
attempted to use the classical microeconomic framework, used so success
fully to model the free market, to conceptualize efficiency considerations
in the public sector. A significant branch of economic study now con
centrates on the theory of public goods, toll goods, and common pool
resources, on the nature of externalities, and on public pricing. By
clearly defining the nature of each specific good or service and disaggregating the production process of each good, opportunities for
competitive bidding and direct pricing become more evident.
Practical Reasons
Practical reasons stem from a variety of fiscal, personnel, entre
preneurial, and urbanization consideration:
— avoiding the growth of city employment in which it may be
difficult to cut back at some later date
— encourage the growth of the local private sector
—high capital start-up costs
— severe hiring restrictions for public employment
— internal labor problems such as unionization and collective bar
gaining
—supplemental forces needed to cope with an emergency or high
demand, e.g., supplemental snow removal
— need for increased quality control; department becomes indepen
dent quality control agent
— lower cost of production by private firm or consolidation with
other governmental units
— multinucleation of urban settlements in counties surrounding cities
— federal grant programs with uncertain futures increase the appro
priateness of contractin gout services to private and not-for-profit
organization
PR O B L E M S IN T H E S E L E C T IO N A N D
IM P L E M E N T A T IO N O F A L T E R N A T IV E S
T O C IT Y D E P A R T M E N T S
T he following can be identified as the major constraints in imple
menting institutional change in the delivery of urban services:
— threat of reorganization to city employees; this remains probably
the major constraint, especially where the local government author
ity is unionized
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— lack of information about alternative arrangements and their suc
cesses and failures
— the degree to which performance measures can be specified; pro
grams with clearly defined outcomes are the simplest to contract
out
— the department of public works needs personnel and procedures
appropriate to monitoring performance and contract administration
—procurement process and bidding procedure; problems relate to
single suppliers in small communities, favoritism, graft, and cor
ruption
—citizen response may be negative or mixed
— the desirability of devising an incentive system for private providers
C O N C L U S IO N
An important function of local government is to create appropriate
institutional arrangements for the delivery of municipal services. In
creasingly, due to the pressure of the local fiscal crisis, new approaches
are being explored for the efficient utilization of scarce local public
revenues. Conventional wisdom has been that the governmental depart
ment of public works is best able to provide property-related services
through its own planning, financing, and production operations. Logi
cally, it is not necessary that governmental provision necessitates gov
ernmental production. There is an observable trend towards the use
of alternative institutional arrangements including consolidation, special
districting, contracting, franchising, issuing of vouchers, and regulating
the private market. In one direction these shifts indicate a trend
towards increased cooperation between governmental units. In another
direction, they indicate a trend to include more competitive elements
and to draw more directly on the marketing, production, and managerial
expertise of the private sector.
M ost interestingly the trends discussed in this paper highlight that
public service industries are a complex interdependence of govern
mental, private enterprise and not-for-profit community organizations.
T he demarcation between private and public sector engineering is
becoming increasingly fuzzy.

